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A B S T R A C T
‘Big Brother is watching you!’ the posters in Orwell's Oceania told all its inhabitants. We have no such posters,
but we live in the era of Big Data, and someone is watching us. Here, I discuss how Big Data is an omniscient and
ubiquitous presence in our society. I then examine to what degree Big Data threatens liberty in both the negative
and positive conception of the term. I arrive at three propositions: a) Big Data threatens privacy and enables
surveillance, b) the lack of alternatives to lifestyles that involve feeding into Big Data leads to something akin to
forced participation in the surveillance of Big Brother, and c) surveillance and lack of privacy are a threat to
freedom, because i) the information gathered can be abused, ii) people have a right not to be observed (even if
the surveillance is completely benign), and iii) being observed is an intervention that can affect those who are
observed. Together, these propositions lead to the conclusion that Big Data threatens liberty. I argue that the
positive conception of liberty provides the strongest argument against how we currently employ Big Data, but
that the negative conception can also provide a sufficiently strong argument. On this basis, a liberal defence of
privacy, and thus also of liberty, against this new form of surveillance can be established.
1. Introduction
‘Big Brother is watching you!’ proclaim the posters in Orwell's
Oceania [35]. We have no such posters, but someone is watching us.
The websites we visit, the products we like, who we find attractive and
how we move around – all this is observed, stored and finally analysed.
We live in the era of Big Data [1–3].
The concept of Big Data links up with the idea of Big Brother, in that
Big Data is a kind of omniscient and ubiquitous presence. I examine
whether or not Big Data threatens freedom, both in the negative and in
the positive sense [4]. I argue that privacy is threatened by how we
employ Big Data, and that the various forms of surveillance that ensue
constitute a threat to liberty.
I arrive at three propositions in the course of this paper, and they
will serve as premises for my main argument. These propositions are: a)
Big Data threatens privacy and enables surveillance, b) the lack of al-
ternatives to lifestyles that involve feeding into Big Data leads to
something akin to forced participation in the surveillance of Big
Brother, and c) surveillance and the lack of privacy are a threat to
freedom, because i) the information gathered can be abused and ii)
people have a right not to be observed (even if the surveillance is
completely benign). Using these propositions as premises for my overall
argument, I show that liberty, in both the negative and the positive
sense, is threatened. It is a two-pronged threat to liberty since a) we
experience a lack of alternatives to taking part in the collection of Big
Data, and b) taking part involves a loss of liberty by placing us under
surveillance. The positive conception of liberty provides the strongest
argument against how we currently employ Big Data, but the negative
conception can also provide a sufficiently strong argument. On this
basis, a liberal defence of privacy, and thus also of liberty, against this
new form of surveillance can be established. Finally, I wish to note that
my concern in this paper is liberty, and while it is obvious that Big Data
provides great benefits, my concern is not to find the proper trade-off
between utility and liberty. I merely argue that Big Data poses a threat to
liberty. Liberty is a foundational value of what Griffy-Brown, Earp &
Rosas [5] refer to as the Good Society, and this is thus an effort to un-
derstand how technology can be detrimental to our society. While we
may state that the benefits it brings are well worth it, we should not
accept such technologies without at the same time clearly recognising
the costs incurred in terms of lost privacy and lost liberty.
2. Big Data in modern society
The term Big Data is often defined by the three V's: volume, velocity,
and variety [6]. Volume refers to the massive amounts of data collected,
velocity to the speed of data generation and analysis, and variety to the
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‘structural heterogeneity’ of the data [7]; p. 137). Big Data is not only
new in the sense that we now create bigger data sets than we used to, but
also because this bigness has led to new requirements for data analysis
and data processing [8]; p. 45 [1]; p. 662).
A related concept is machine learning. In order to analyse the data we
gather, we no longer rely on human insight or old style statistical
analysis. Some even argue that we may no longer need humans in
science etc. Since the machines can now replace us [9]. We have cre-
ated machines that can learn without being told explicitly what to look
for. We simply give them certain goals, and these systems ‘improve
their performance on a given task over time through experience’ [10];
p. 9). As these systems learn, we use the knowledge gained to perform
tasks historically thought to require intelligence, such as determining
who should be granted loans, suggesting what movies I might be in-
terested in etc. When employed in this way, we have artificial intelligence
[10]; p. 9).
2.1. The gathering of Big Data
We leave countless traces of our daily activities in the rapidly
growing collections of databases. A multitude of companies and in-
stitutions gather the different snippets of data, and the whole structure
that has been set up to gather data has been called the ‘surveillant as-
semblage’ [11]. This term refers to the combined effects of private and
public efforts, markets and institutions that, together, form an assem-
blage of surveillance. Much of the information is gathered by private
companies, but government ‘is an important secondary beneficiary’
[12]; p. 1916).
I work on the assumption that we can meaningfully consider Big
Data a phenomenon that involves a unitary threat to liberty. As such, I
speak of a Big Brother, and not many small brothers. This assumption is
not uncontroversial, and I fully accept that there is not one large
company, organisation or government that collects, or organises the
collection of, data. However, I agree with the view of Haggerty &
Ericson ([11], p. 605) that we are seeing a ‘convergence of once discrete
surveillance systems’ – not a convergence in the sense of corporate
consolidation, but in the sense that the countless separate streams of
information about individuals is subsequently combined, shared, traded
and reassembled to provide a comprehensive and full description of
individuals and their actions. Big Data consists of a large number of
surveillance sources that function as an assemblage – the unity of this
Big Brother is not formal, but functional [13].
2.2. From Big Data to Big Brother
Big Data is valuable in various ways, and the benefits are both well-
known and extensively covered. I fully accept the utility of Big Data,
and this is not a statement against Big Data in general. I focus on its
implications for liberty, while recognising that liberty is not everything.
The trade-off between utility and liberty is a complicated one, and I
merely ask that, when we side with utility, we do so while recognising
that it comes at the cost of lost liberty.
Alan Westin's [37] Privacy and Freedom discussed the challenges to
privacy from new technologies and public concern about the dangers of
Big Brother. More than fifty years later, the book is arguably more re-
levant than ever before. Big Data has changed things, since Big Brother
has never had a better chance to work his magic while both keeping an
eye on what is happening and preventing what he does not like. Overt
surveillance may have given way to covert surveillance – a form that
feels quite cosy, and that is less dependent on authority and police
enforcement, and more on the apparently voluntary provision of data.
We agree to terms most of us do not even read [14]. The data collected
are today's gold, and we happily give them away to gain access to
various services. We connect with people and companies, get news and
laughs, and in living our lives this way, we provide all the information
required to really know us well.
The price we pay for ‘free’ services is to open the curtains that once
hid our private sphere. If all the information I provide to various sites
were kept isolated from other data, this would weaken my assumption
that Big Data is a kind of assemblage that works as a functional entity.
We know, however, that the different sites do sell the information we
provide, and some major controversies have highlighted such problems,
for example the Cambridge Analytica scandal involving Facebook
[15,16].
Besides information that is provided voluntarily, information is also
gathered from various other sources, such as GPS signals, satellite
images, surveillance footage, information from mobile phone compa-
nies, smart electricity meters etc. Some of this information requires
consent, and some of it is gathered with government blessing.
In sum, Big Data might turn into a form of Big Brother, in that it is
omniscient and ubiquitous. While Big Data Brother is actually watching
you, the political aspects of our societies and Orwell's Oceania are still
quite different [35]. Big Brother is the head of an imaginary totalitarian
society, but this form of surveillance is not restricted to societies such as
Orwell's Oceania. Big Data may take us there, though, and both Cohen
and Berlin argue that the loss of privacy could lead to societies that are
less liberal, and less well functioning [4]; p. 176 [12]; pp. 1904–5).
2.3. The first proposition
Based on these considerations I have arrived at the first proposition:
Big Data in modern society involves gathering vast amounts of data,
even the most private data, from individuals. Big Data thus threatens
privacy and enables surveillance.
Firstly, Big Data involves gathering large amounts of people's pri-
vate data. It is possible to deny that this is happening, or to state that
Big Data is not necessarily connected to private data. I argue that I have
shown that it is in fact happening today, and it is this phenomenon I am
discussing – not some ideal and limited, alternative implementation of
Big Data.
Secondly, if massive amounts of private data are being gathered,
privacy is, naturally, under threat.
Thirdly, the tools and routines used to gather the information de-
scribed in this section enable surveillance. We may assert that the col-
lection of data constitutes surveillance in and of itself, but we need not.
It suffices to state that the data, when gathered, exist and may be used
for surveillance purposes in some unknown future.
3. Liberty, positive and negative
Liberty has many meanings, and I have chosen Berlin's [4] concepts
of positive and negative liberty as my frame of reference when evalu-
ating the impact Big Data has on liberty. Coeckelbergh [38] calls for
political philosophy to be used when analysing the effects of tech-
nology, and I agree with him that this tradition ‘offers excellent re-
sources for thinking about’ issues such as technology and liberty [38].
Berlin [4] describes negative liberty as ‘the degree to which no man
or body of men interferes with my activity’ [4]; p. 169). Negative lib-
erty involves being allowed to ‘act unobstructed’ and ‘not being pre-
vented by others from doing what I could otherwise do’ [4]; p. 169). A
certain minimum of ‘contraction’ by other men is inevitable, but any-
thing beyond this would make me ‘coerced, or it may be, enslaved’ [4];
p. 169). If I am unable to achieve something, this does not give me
occasion to speak of unfreedom, unless that inability is caused by other
men [4]; p. 169).
Positive liberty involves a desire ‘on the part of the individual to be
his own master’ [4]; p. 178). It is sometimes referred to as self-mastery
[17]. Wanting my life to be the result of nothing but my own volition
and actions, I would label any external influence that prevents me from
achieving what I desire a violation of my liberty [4]; p. 178). Fur-
thermore, the focus is on being a subject, not an object, and ‘deciding,
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not being decided for, self-directed, and not acted upon by external
nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave
incapable or playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and
policies of my own and realising them’ [4]; p. 178). Positive liberty
involves more than being free to act, it also requires that my actions are
the result of my own autonomous reflective activity.
Positive liberty involves some far-reaching conditions that must be
satisfied. For me to be free, it is not sufficient that I am unobstructed, if
I am fundamentally enslaved in some way. Slavery to nature, slavery to
the passions, and spiritual slavery are examples. Emancipation may
lead to a ‘higher’ understanding of the self, in which one can, for ex-
ample, identify the self with all other beings [4]; p. 179). If we move
along this path, there is little that cannot be argued to stand in the way
of an individual's freedom. It even becomes possible to force a person to
be free, by releasing her from whatever slavery we find her to be in Ref.
[4]; p. 179). Positive liberty is thus not a goal for most liberal theorists,
but rather a danger to be warned against. I use both the negative and
the positive concepts of liberty to elucidate the different requirements
that follow from them, without deciding which one we should pursue.
I will also refer to the proposal that liberty is non-domination [18].
This is elsewhere referred to as republican liberty. Pettit places this
concept between positive and negative liberty. It is negative in the sense
of requiring the absence of domination by others and not requiring self-
mastery, and positive in the sense that it demands something more than
the mere absence of interference – it requires protection against inter-
ference as well [18]; p. 51). When non-domination is considered a
prerequisite of liberty, I consider the mere fact that someone has power
to coerce you and dominate you to be a violation of liberty, and not just
active use of this force to control your actions. I will propose an argu-
ment akin to Hobbes's view of war as the possibility of war, and not only
active fighting, when I consider the possible threat to freedom posed by
Big Data [19]. The uncertainty that follows from the risk of data leaks,
human error, hostile hacking attempts, the sale of data, change of
ownership of companies, change of government, or simply a change in
the intentions and plans of the actors we once trusted, makes the mere
existence of data a threat.
Negative liberty focuses on physical and legal obstructions, while
positive liberty opens up for a much broader examination of the con-
dition one is in. The scope of the current paper does not allow for a
thorough examination of the implications of the two forms of freedom,
and I refer to Berlin's Two Concepts of Liberty [4] and Taylor's [20]
critique of the concept of negative liberty in his paper What's wrong with
negative liberty for a fuller description. See also MacCallum [21] and
Skinner [22] for a more general critique of the concept of two separate
kinds of liberty.
4. When Big Brother sees you
4.1. Privacy and private information
Privacy refers to the sphere in which one can expect to be com-
pletely unobserved, and it denotes both information and acts that are
considered private. As such, privacy is a concept whose content can
change depending on the user's views of what is properly private and
public. It is a difficult term to define, and it has been used to express a
confusing variety of concepts [37]. Westin ([37], p. 7) ventures the
following definition:
Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to de-
termine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others
It is characterised by being voluntary and temporary, and it involves
withdrawal from the public – either physically or psychologically [37].
Privacy is thus a constant battle between my desire to withdraw and the
curiosity of both the government and other people. The judicial aspects
of privacy are beyond the scope of this article, and I posit that people
have a right to privacy [23].
In order to provoke as few objections as possible, I will assume that
this right protects only a minimal sphere that most people would agree
should be private. This right entitles me to object when, for example,
my neighbour wants to survey my house out of curiosity, or when the
government has a desire to track my movements using a GPS tracker.
There must be some sphere I can retreat into in order to meaningfully
experience privacy. I therefore reject the proposition that liberty is
consistent with the position that everything is political. Individuals
must be able to deny the public access to certain parts of their lives.
Big Data threatens privacy in several ways. Firstly, if I live a stan-
dard life, using regular tools and services that are ubiquitous in our
society, I will have to surrender private information. Secondly, even if I
attempt to keep my strictly personal information to myself, many
groups and organisations are now virtual, meaning that information
about meetings, communication etc. is gathered, and sometimes made
public. This can also be construed as a violation of my privacy. Finally,
some information is gathered against our wishes or without our
knowledge, justified by concerns such as safety and security, anti-terror
legislation etc.
4.1.1. Big Data and superficial voluntariness
It may be objected that the first two threats are agreed to volunta-
rily, and that everyone has the option to refrain from such activities.
One of the reasons why it is so hard to not feed into Big Data, is that a
lot of the services that collect most data are practically a necessity for
people today. Social media sites such as Facebook are where friends and
family communicate, colleagues coordinate social events, and parents
meet in various groups to coordinate their children's various activities
etc. Not taking part is possible but comes at a high social price. Saying
‘no’ to the user agreements provided by, for example, social media sites
is of course possible, but may involve being ‘deprived of critical services’
[24]; p. 586).
For participation to be voluntary, alternatives must exist. When
people are required to have accounts with, for example, Facebook, in
order to get crucial information about their children's activities, studies,
social events etc., freedom of choice disappears. People are left with the
choice between either grudgingly complying with the new normality of
surveillance, or becoming like Luddites in a new social pariah caste. In
addition, banks and government services are becoming increasingly
digital, while traditional alternatives disappear.
As regards negative liberty, we do not have to agree with Thomas
Hobbes that a person threatened with grave consequences is still at
liberty to act freely. Hobbes relates the story of a man in trouble at sea
who faces the dilemma of either a) throwing his goods overboard, or b)
sinking. According to Hobbes, the man is free to sink, so no liberty is
lost [19]; p. 137). In a similar vein, we are free to reject everything
digital. Voluntary acts are free acts for Hobbes, but it is Berlin who
defines our liberty. Within the framework of Berlin's negative liberty, a
robber with a gun obstructs and disrupts the liberty of the person he
robs. His interference is clear, and his intention is to constrict our lib-
erty and coerce us into acting in a certain way. The specifics of this
debate is beyond the scope of this article, and I refer to Carter's [17]
discussion for more detail on how such situations does not necessary
lead to a loss of specific freedom, while still leading to a loss of overall
freedom. Lanier [25] and Zuboff [26] provide detailed accounts of the
difficulties of escaping the gaze of Big Brother.
Foreshadowing one of my conclusions, it seems likely that privacy is
a good that is not best served by an individualised approach. I will
argue that privacy is a public good, and that we must consider it a task
for government to prevent situations where people are forced to
abandon privacy in order to live what would be considered normal
lives. What constitutes a normal life, and when liberty is lost by not
being allowed such a life, are big questions that are beyond the scope of
this article. I will also note that in the current setting, we do not need to
say that privacy has intrinsic value. It may simply be valuable because it
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has constitutive value, in that it is a necessary condition for liberty [17];
p. 54).
4.2. The second proposition
Based on these considerations, I arrive at the second proposition:
A lack of alternatives to lifestyles that involve feeding into Big Data
leads to something akin to forced participation in the surveillance of
Big Brother
Freedom can be said to consist of having alternatives to choose
between. In modern society, we are running out of alternatives that let
us live outside the gaze of Big Brother. I fully recognise that, theoreti-
cally, we may avoid much of the surveillance. However, doing so in-
volves incurring higher and higher costs because essential societal
functions are organised through, for example, social media. Other parts
of the surveillance are performed by government decree. Examples here
would be the requirement that households install smart electricity
meters in their homes or that all cars are required to have GPS trans-
mitters etc.
4.3. Surveillance and freedom
Surveillance can be defined as attention that is focused on an in-
dividual in order to obtain some kind of information. Surveillance can
also be general, i.e. information on all or most people is gathered. While
the focus is broad, there is still attention on each individual and those
behind the surveillance will be able to identify the actions of each
observed person. Westin [37] distinguishes between direct surveillance
and indirect surveillance. The first involves actively watching a parti-
cular person, whereas indirect surveillance involves gathering records
and information that are subsequently used to determine the need for
direct surveillance.
I distinguish between three kinds of surveillance. Firstly, it is im-
portant to note that surveillance does not necessarily lead to inter-
ference in people's lives. Someone might gather information about
others without doing anything to steer, guide or prevent the actions of
the person observed. If so, observation is all this is, and the person is,
technically, as free to act as he would have been without being ob-
served. The electricity meters in our homes provides such information.
Certain forms of video surveillance that are installed merely to observe
and document behaviour etc. are of this kind. This I label passive ob-
servation.
Secondly, we can imagine that an act is committed under surveil-
lance, and that the person observing uses the information as evidence in
order to punish or reward the actor in retrospect. This form of sur-
veillance could, of course, also be benign. Perhaps the information
gathered is used to reward pro-social behaviour, or in order to give
good citizens credits in a government-run reward scheme. China is
planning such a scheme whereby citizens will be given a ‘Citizen Score’
that will determine their chances of obtaining loans, visas etc. [27].
However, such schemes would strike most of us as totalitarian rather
than benign, even if they were designed to provide rewards instead of
punishment. While the first situation constituted passive observation, I
call this active observation.
The third kind of surveillance is the one we most often think of,
where those behind the surveillance use it actively to both punish and
reward actions already performed and to prevent planned actions. If a
government agency receives information that a group of individuals is
planning a terrorist attack, it will intervene rather than use this in-
formation to punish the individuals afterwards. This is surveillance
proper. See Fig. 1 for a description of the three forms of surveillance.
4.3.1. The threat of passive surveillance
How do the three forms of surveillance affect liberty? To examine
the situation that is least likely to be problematic, let us conduct a
thought experiment. Assume that we have discovered a new form of
being that we call the Observer. The Observer does not exist in physical
space, has no memory and has no possible means of communicating. It
can, however, observe whatever it desires. Would we have cause to
complain about being observed by this being that has no possible means
of using, or abusing, the information it gathers and no possibility of
influencing our lives in any other way than by the fact that it can ob-
serve us?
Imagine yourself at home, alone with your spouse. You have a de-
sire for intimacy with your spouse, but suddenly you become aware that
the Observer is watching you. Would this affect your behaviour in any
way? If we assume that his lack of memory and inability to store in-
formation is real, there is no reason to worry about the possible abuse of
actions the Observer observes. I could, however, cite my right to
privacy, and state that, for me, liberty partly consists in this right being
protected. If the Observer sees me, I am not free, because my right to
privacy is obstructed – purposefully – by another being. The reason I
demand privacy is of little consequence, but I could cite reasons such as
modesty and the desire to do things that would cause me to feel sha-
meful if I knew that someone was observing me. Observation alone
would hinder me. I could, for example, simply feel that the Observer
would judge me. Being observed changes my behaviour. Since I act
differently when observed, I lack liberty if there is no space in which I
can be unobserved.
4.3.2. The threat of active surveillance
When we can be punished after-the-fact based on evidence gath-
ered, our actions are more likely to be affected by the observation.
Some actions will be more costly due to the fact that I know that I will
be punished. I do not take issue with liberty and the law, and take the
view that liberty consists in living in accordance with a limited set of
laws that are necessary to keep order. This is akin to Bastiat's [28]; p.
25) view that, for an individual, (proper) laws are not a violation of ‘his
personality, his liberty, nor his property. They safeguard all of these’.
Consider now my freedom to perform immoral acts – acts that people
frown upon – without them being illegal. I would probably feel pressure
to abstain from those as well. This is an issue Tocqueville [29] notes in
his examination of American democracy – the tyranny of the majority.
The majority can create a set of opinions and actions that are accepted,
while others are met with social sanctions without being illegal. In
America, Tocqueville noted, this set was so limited, and the sanctions so
harsh, that people lacked both spiritual independence and real freedom
of speech [29]; p. 293). It is easy to envisage freedom of action suffering
as a result of the same mechanisms as freedom of discussion.
4.3.3. The threat of surveillance proper
An interesting aspect of surveillance proper is that it leads to people
being arrested for planning crimes not yet committed. Conspiring to do
such things has been declared a crime, so a criminal act has been
committed just by planning the actions, and acts of this kind are hard to
uncover without surveillance of some sort. Thus, we have arrived at the
most common justification for surveillance.
If we follow the argument of political philosophers like Thomas
Fig. 1. The three forms of surveillance.
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Hobbes, we accept that people will, by necessity, award some rights of
surveillance to the sovereign power in order to preserve what is most
important: safety, order and the survival of the political community
[19]. While Hobbes states that the government should have no more
such rights than necessary, he is not comfortable about erecting solid
barriers the authorities may never pass. More liberal theorists, such as
John Locke, do not have such qualms [30]; p. 184). Either way, we
probably cannot both claim absolute rights against government sur-
veillance and say that we want the government to ensure order. In order
to use the concept of liberty in a meaningful sense, we must be able to
consider ourselves free, even in society. This is a case where utility
clearly trumps absolute liberty. But can we sacrifice liberty for others
purposes than safety? This is the age-old question of political theory
and the legitimacy of the state. According to Hobbes [19], security and
survival are the only things men can universally agree upon as goods.
Thus, the state can legitimately limit our liberty through the use of
surveillance aimed at promoting order, although this logic does not
allow surveillance in order to promote other goods that might be seen
as luxuries.
4.3.4. Danger of abuse
Finally, I briefly consider more traditional arguments against sur-
veillance, such as a) the possibility that the information will be used in
other ways than we are led to believe, b) the fact that information,
being stored, may come into the wrong (or just other) hands later on,
and c) the possibility that the information will be used against us in new
and novel ways in future that we cannot now foresee.
The first option involves either deception or simply a lack of un-
derstanding on the part of users. When people create their accounts on
Facebook, they assume that the information they provide will not be
used to target them politically, for example in order to influence how
they vote. One might argue that they should be aware of such risks. If
sufficiently many do not understand the risks, government regulation
might be necessary in order to prevent the exploitation of individuals’
trust. This is partly because of a general desire to preserve privacy and
liberty, but also partly because of the near mandatory nature of such
services in modern society.
The second option involves factors such as the chance of human
error, the sale and transfer of information between corporations, or-
ganisations and government, and theft of data. While criminal ex-
ploitation of data, identity theft, hacking etc. are certainly possible, a
full examination of the degree of risk each of the above possibilities
entails is beyond the scope of this article.
The third option is of great importance, since it suggests that we
should adopt a precautionary stance towards privacy regulation. While
providing data may not pose a risk today, we have no guarantee that it
will not be used for malign (from our perspective) purposes tomorrow.
What if new regulations allow such data to be shared and used for
purposes such as pricing insurance, granting travel visas, gaining access
to public services etc.?
In addition to the threats of abuse, Big Data poses a threat in itself,
so I might not even need to consider abuse in order to construct a liberal
defence of privacy. When the foregoing points are combined with the
possibility of abuse, however, we see the contours of an even greater
threat to liberty.
4.4. The third proposition
The above considerations lead to the third proposition:
Surveillance and the lack of privacy are a threat to freedom, because
a) the information gathered can be abused, b) people have a right
not to be observed (even if the surveillance is completely benign),
and c) being observed is an intervention that can affect the observed
person.
Not having privacy is a threat to freedom for three reasons. The first
is based on a precautionary principle, which implies that surveillance
and observation are wrong simply because they are risky – not because
they are wrong in themselves. However, the second reason is that we
can legitimately view it as wrong in principle to deprive people of a
right to privacy. Thirdly. regardless of rights, surveillance is an inter-
vention that changes my behaviour and makes it costlier to perform
actions that I would prefer to be unobserved. Some might say that
someone who has nothing to hide should have no objection to sur-
veillance, but this is a flawed argument. The costs created by surveil-
lance apply to actions that are not illegal or constitute ‘something to
hide’ in the judicial sense.
5. Freedom under the gaze of Big Brother
5.1. Introduction
With these three premises established, it is time to see what con-
clusions follow. The premises in short form are as follows, but please
refer to their full statement for more detail and precision. See Fig. 2 for
the premises and their relationship with liberty.
There are two main conclusions that follow from the premises
presented. They are 1) that Big Data poses a threat to both positive and
negative liberty, but perhaps especially to the concept of liberty as non-
domination described by Pettit [18]; and 2) individuals' liberty may be
under threat even if the individuals themselves do not divulge in-
formation. Privacy may in fact be a public good.
5.2. Big Data is a threat to positive and negative liberty
5.2.1. The threat to positive liberty
The premises lead to the conclusion that positive liberty is under
threat. As P1 is combined with P3, we see that a lack of privacy and
being under surveillance threaten liberty both because of the risk of
abuse of information and because the fact of being observed is a vio-
lation of a person's right to have a private sphere in which he will be
neither observed nor disturbed.
While a negative conception of liberty may allow us to disregard
many factors that influence a person because they are inimical to liberty,
the positive conception does not. If I am to be my own master, I must
have the privacy required to act as if unobstructed. Being observed is an
obstruction insofar as it imposes various costs on actions that a person
may have a desire to perform. If I am observed, and thus act differently
than I would otherwise want to, my actions are not the actions of a
positively free person.
It is possible to argue that, if I am truly my own master, I should be
strong enough to withstand the pressure of expectation, and withstand
the possibility of social sanctions. In my opinion, human traits such as
modesty and shame must be accepted instead of wished away. This
means that it is problematic to legislate on the assumption that people
are, or should be, free from such influences, and that we should instead
legislate in ways that remove the possibility of making people less free
Fig. 2. The premises and their effect on liberty.
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by not taking things such as modesty into consideration. We might wish
that our spouses, and others, had no problem with surveillance at home,
so that the government could protect everyone even better, but since
that is not the case, such a policy cannot be accepted.
Positive liberty requires that I be given space to both become and act
as my own master, and surveillance can prevent both these things from
happening. Berlin imagines an autonomous person ‘not acted upon by
external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a
slave incapable or playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and
policies of my own and realising them’ [4]; p. 178). This, I argue, is not
a person under surveillance.
5.2.2. The threat to negative liberty
For negative liberty, we can make a somewhat weaker – but still
strong – argument for the case that Big Data is a threat. With the third
premise, we may only need the first part, which concerns the risk of
abuse, in order to argue that surveillance and lack of privacy are in-
imical to liberty. If so we would be constructing an argument that re-
sembles Pettit's [18] liberty as non-domination. I will argue that a
practical doctrine aimed at protecting liberty in the negative sense also
requires safeguards against future interference, and I have shown that
this will most likely involve restricting what sort of data can be gath-
ered, or at least what information can be stored and transferred, and
how it can be used – now and in the future.
It can also be argued that being deprived of the right to privacy is in
itself a violation of negative liberty, due to the combination of the first
and second premises. Berlin discusses non-interference when discussing
negative liberty [4]. While being observed constitutes a violation of the
space required to be positively free, I argue that it can also be inter-
preted as a form of interference.
Say that I, when at home alone, have a desire to watch movies that
most people consider morally disgusting. If I can get a hold of such
movies without anyone observing it, I would do so. However, if I know
that others are registering and taking note of the movies I acquire, I
might abstain. The introduction of observation is interference, and, if I
cannot choose to not be observed, negative liberty is violated. I would
argue that this was the case because a) someone could use this in-
formation against me in the future, b) I have a right to privacy with
regard to my choice of movies, and c) I dare not watch the movies I
want to watch when I am being watched, so this observation interferes
with my ability to perform lawful actions that hurt no-one. I could say
that I am ‘coerced, or it may be, enslaved’ because my inability to do
what I desire is caused by the conscious and intentional actions of other
men [4]; p. 169).
5.3. Privacy is a public good
An argument against the individualised approach to privacy reg-
ulation is that privacy might actually be a common good [31]. Public
goods are usually considered to be non-excludable and non-rival, and
the general preservation of privacy fits well with such a description. In
the terminology of Barrett [32]; I consider this to be a public good in
the category aggregate effort, as it requires the participation of most in
order to be provided.
The fact that some people choose to bargain away their privacy has
negative effects on the people around them. When enough people like
me bargain away their privacy, data exist that can then be used to
target me, even if I should turn down every opportunity to bargain away
my privacy in return for online services etc. The profiles of people who
share my main characteristics and willingly share their information
might be sufficient to enable actors to violate my liberty in various
ways. Had I been able to hide all information about myself, I would not
be at risk, but that is an impossible scenario. Since some information
about me exists, those who wish to target me will superimpose this
information on the vast amounts of information they have about others,
and thereby know much more than I would have wanted.
Others' attitude to privacy will also have more direct ramifications
for me, in that their sharing of information will, by necessity, also in-
clude some information on their various relations and social life.
Secondary data on me is then gathered, and services may even create
secret ‘shadow profiles’ on me in which to store all this information,
even if I actively choose not to have anything to do with the service.
See, for example, the article One plus one makes three (for social net-
works) [33] for information about how the information supplied by
members is used to obtain information about non-members. See also
McMillan [34] for more about how social networks create privacy
problems for non-members. I am unable to deal fully with this issue
here, and merely conclude that this point is very important when
considering what is the best approach to regulating privacy and the use
of Big Data.
6. Conclusion: Big Data is a threat to liberty
Big Data can be seen as constituting a form of surveillance. This
surveillance is problematic, and I argue that freedom is threatened
under the gaze of Big Brother. It is important to note that the technology
of Big Data is neutral, and that it is the way we apply it that is threa-
tening.
The three premises I have presented lead to the conclusion that
liberty, both positive and negative, is threatened, and that privacy is a
public good. There are therefore several reasons for adherents of liber-
alism to be wary of the effects of Big Data and how we currently reg-
ulate (or do not regulate) it.
It could be argued that liberalism is concerned with freedom, and
that this freedom means that businesses and government must be free to
innovate and use new technology to gather data. As long as this is based
on voluntary actions, many liberals would not object, and some would
even claim that the economic benefits of how we use Big Data today
more than outweigh the negative effects on privacy and other forms of
liberty. In the areas of science and business, there are many examples of
how the advent of Big Data has resulted in great benefits. I fully accept
these benefits, but that does not alter the fact that it poses a threat to
liberty. We must make a trade-off, and that means that we must con-
sider how highly we value liberty.
I argue that liberty requires privacy, and that the individual's right
to a sphere which no one can enter without express agreement is fun-
damental, and more so than businesses' freedom to innovate and ob-
serve others. This is particularly important since I also argue that
agreeing to the collection of personal data is close to compulsory in
today's society, and that privacy is a common good. The regime of notice
and choice is therefore not sufficient to constitute informed consent, and
we must move from individualised regulation of privacy to government
regulation. The government has a role in providing common goods, and
the area of privacy is a prime candidate for government intervention.
How this can be achieved, particularly since this is a deeply problematic
issue due to its digital and international nature, is one of the most
pressing issues in modern society. Big Brother's gaze must be averted, if
people are to be fully free. To be their own masters, if you wish, or
simply to ensure that people are not ‘coerced, and enslaved’, to use the
words of Isiah Berlin [4].
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